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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the impact of a decade of transition on the living standards of people 
living in seven of the poorest Republics of the former Soviet Union  – Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (known as the 
CIS-7). Data are drawn from a wide variety of sources, providing a comprehensive 
overview of household and individual welfare within the region. The picture painted is a 
bleak one, with rising income inequality, high levels of material poverty,  and 
deterioration in health status and  in access to health and education services.  However, 
there are now the green shoots of economic recovery.  Since 2000 all countries have 
experienced positive economic growth. The challenge for policy makers is to ensure that 
the benefits of this growth are shared equally amongst the population and that human 
capabilities are protected and strengthened. 
 
SSRC Applications and Policy Working Paper A03/02 
Inequality and Poverty in the CIS-7, 1989-2002 
 
Jane Falkingham  
Inequality and Poverty in the CIS-7, 1989-2002 
Jane Falkingham
1 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................2 
2. TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND POVERTY SINCE INDEPENDENCE............6 
2.1 THE POSITION AT INDEPENDENCE............................................................................6 
2.2 SINCE INDEPENDENCE..............................................................................................7 
2.2.1 Rising Income Inequality...................................................................................7 
2.2.2 Falling real wages and rising wage differentials................................................8 
2.2.3 Material poverty...............................................................................................10 
2.2.4 Poverty and the Russia Crisis ..........................................................................13 
3.  WHO ARE THE POOR? WHICH GROUPS ARE MOST AT RISK OF 
POVERTY?.....................................................................................................................15 
3.1 LOCATION...............................................................................................................15 
3.2 HOUSEHOLD SIZE & DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSI TION..............................................17 
3.3.  EDUCATION ...........................................................................................................19 
3.4 EMPLOYMENT.........................................................................................................20 
3.5 REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS..............................................21 
4.  TRENDS IN CAPABILITY POVERTY.................................................................24 
4.1 HEALTH...................................................................................................................25 
4.1.1 Mortality...........................................................................................................25 
4.1.2 Nutritional status..............................................................................................29 
4.1.3 Access to health care........................................................................................32 
4.1.4 Access to safe drinking water and other services ............................................35 
4.2  EDUCATION............................................................................................................38 
4.2.1 Enrolment.........................................................................................................38 
4.2.2 School Attendance ...........................................................................................39 
4.2.3 Gender and Education......................................................................................42 
5. POLICY RESPONSES TO POVERTY...................................................................44 
5.1 PROMOTING PRO-POOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, REDUCING INCOME INEQUALITIES
.......................................................................................................................................44 
5.2. PROTECTING AND BUILDING HUMAN CAPABILITIES.............................................46 
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................49 
 
 
                                                  
1 Department of Social Statistics, University of Southampton, UK. This paper was 
prepared for the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 Initiative, January 20-22, 2003.   2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the impact of a decade of transition on living standards and welfare 
in seven of the poorest Republics of the former Soviet Union – Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (known as the CIS-7). At 
independence all of the newly formed CIS-7 Republics inherited high levels of human 
capital. Education and health care were universal and provided free at the point of 
delivery, and there were extensive social services and transfers. The Republics also, 
however, inherited economic structures that were heavily dependent on Soviet supply and 
trade networks. Russia was the main source of inputs and the main market for outputs. 
Transport and other infrastructure was designed with the view to meeting these needs and 
not necessarily those of the local economy.  High social spending was supported by large 
budgetary transfers from Moscow.  It is estimated that in the late 1980s/early 1990s such 
transfers were worth as much as a third of GDP in Armenia and over a fifth in Moldova 
(Vandycke, 2002). 
 
The withdrawal of subsidies from Moscow following independence, combined with the 
interruption of inter-republican trade within the former USSR and the impact of tight 
government stabilisation policies resulted in a dramatic reduction in output across the 
region. The economic shock accompanying the break up of the USSR was further 
exacerbated by a series of natural disasters and by armed conflicts and boarder disputes
2. 
 
Figure 1 shows the annual change in real GDP since 1989. Growth was negative in all 
countries up to 1994/5, since when there has been a gradual reversal of fortunes. The 
decline in economic output was most marked in Georgia, where real output in 1994 was 
just a quarter of the level enjoyed five years previously. Elsewhere, GDP fell to between 
a third and a half its previous level. To put these changes into perspective, even at the 
lowest point of the Great Depression of the 1930s, GDP in the USA did not fall to below 
three-quarters of its pre-depression level
3. Recovery  faltered somewhat following the 
1998 Russian fiscal crisis, with Moldova actually experienced a return to negative growth 
(Table 1). All countries have experienced positive growth during the last three years. 
Growth has been particularly strong in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan – although the 
latter has been from a low base. Nevertheless, real output remains significantly below 
pre-transition levels in all countries except Uzbekistan.  
 
                                                  
2 Armenia and Azerbaijan 1988-94; south Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia 1990-94; Transdniestr in 
Moldova 1992; Civil War in Tajikistan 1992-3 and on-going armed conflict 1993-7; and the Ferghana 
Valley, affecting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 1989-91.) 
3  In 1933, four years after the Wall Street Crash, real GDP in the USA was around 75 percent of its 1927 
level. This was the low point of the depression and after 1933 positive growth was resumed (Milanovic, 
1998).   3 
Figure 1: Trends in GDP 1989-2002
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Table 1 Average annual growth rates in GDP, CIS-7 1989-2002 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Armenia  -7.4  -17.1  -52.6  -14.8  5.4  6.9  5.9  3.3  7.2  3.3  6.0  9.6  6.5 
Azerbaijan  -11.7  -0.7  -22.6  -23.1  -19.7  -11.8  1.3  5.8  10.0  7.4  11.1  9.9  8.5 
Georgia  -12.4  -13.8  -44.8  -25.4  -11.4  2.4  10.5  10.8  2.9  3.0  2.0  4.5  3.0 
Kyrgyzstan  3  -5  -19  -16  -20.1  -5.4  7.1  9.9  2.1  3.7  5.1  5.3  5.0 
Moldova  -2.4  -17.5  -29.0  -1.0  -31.2  -1.4  -5.9  1.6  -6.5  -3.4  2.1  4.5  3.5 
Tajikistan  -1.6  -7.1  -29.0  -11.0  -18.9  -12.5  -4.4  1.7  5.3  3.7  8.3  10.2  6.0 
Uzbekistan  1.6  -0.5  -11.1  -2.3  -4.2  -0.9  1.6  2.5  4.4  4.1  4.0  4.5  2.0 
Source: 1990-1993 EBRD Transition Report 1997; 1994-2002 EBRD Transition Report Update, May 
2002. 
 
Not only has the magnitude of the decline in real GDP in the CIS-7 been greater than 
elsewhere, but the duration of the economic depression has also been longer.  Most of the 
countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltics experienced three to four years negative 
growth in GDP (Milanovic, 1998), whereas GDP declined for six successive y ears in 
Moldova and Azerbaijan (1989-1995) and seven in Tajikistan.  It is acknowledged that 
Figure 1 and Table 1 may over-estimate the fall in output and under-estimate subsequent 
economic growth as they reflect measured output only. It is clear that as the old state 
enterprises have contracted or closed they have been replaced by private sector activity, 
much of which is in the ‘grey’ or ‘informal’ sector. A study by Kaufman and Kaliberda 
(1996) estimated the size of the informal sector in the mid 1990s to vary from less than 
10 percent of GDP in Uzbekistan to over 60 percent in Georgia. By 2001, the informal 
sector had grown to account for a third of GDP in Uzbekistan and nearly two-thirds in   4 
Georgia (Djankov and Murrell, 2002)4. However, even after accepting that there may be 
measurement problems, it remains clear that the region has suffered a severe decline in 
economic output, which in turn has had a considerable deleterious impact on both current 
living standards and confidence in, and perceptions of, long-term well-being.  
 
Section 2 of the paper examines changes in the level, composition and distribution of 
incomes and what that has meant in terms of the number of persons and households 
living in material poverty. The factors associated with an increased risk of poverty are 
discussed in Section 3, with a focus on the particular issues faced by specific groups. 
Some groups are more vulnerable to poverty than others due to their limited earning 
potential, dependency and marginalisation. Given armed conflicts and boarder disputes in 
Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan, the position of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and refugees warrant special attention. However the position of other vulnerable 
groups such as families with many children and the elderly are also discussed. Poverty 
amongst rural households is the subject of a separate background paper by Cord et al 
(2002). 
 
Increasingly it is being recognised that material resources, or rather lack thereof, reflect 
just one, albeit very important, dimension of poverty. Being poor goes well beyond a 
narrow lack of material consumption to encompass poor health outcomes, low 
achievement in education and a sense of vulnerability to external events. The multi-
dimensional nature of poverty is explicitly recognised by the International Development 
Goals (IDGs) and their more recent reincarnation, the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Each of the goals addresses an aspect of poverty which is important in its own 
right, and which interacts and mutually reinforces the other aspects of poverty (Box 1). 
Section 4 therefore reviews trends in selected capability-based indicators, reflecting 
changes in the health and education of the population and the extent to which the CIS-7 
are on track to achieve the economic and social MDGs. Finally in Section 5 we focus on 
the structural, policy and institutional factors associated with poverty and the policy 
measures necessary to promote poverty-reducing growth.  
 
                                                  
4 The size of the informal sector in the CIS-7 countries in 2001 as a percentage of GDP is estimated by 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) as 45.3% Armenia, 60.1% Azerbaijan, 66.1% Georgia, 39.4% Kyrgyzstan, 
44.1% Moldova and 33.4% Uzbekistan.   5 
Box 1: The Millenium Development Goals 
GOALS (targets)  INDICATORS 
Economic well-being   
Reduce extreme poverty and hunger 
 
Reduce the proportion of the population living on 
less than $1 a day by one half between 1990 and 
2015 
 
Reduce the proportion of the population suffering 
from hunger by one half between 1990 and 2015. 
 
1. Incidence of Extreme Poverty: Population Below 
$1 Per Day 
2. Poverty Gap Ratio: Incidence times Depth of 
Poverty 
3. Inequality: Poorest Fifth’s Share of National 
Consumption 
4. Child Malnutrition: Prevalence of Underweight 
Children (Under 5) 
5. General Malnutrition: Prevalence of 
undernourishment measured by dietary energy 
supply in the general population 
Social development   
Achieve universal primary education 
There should be universal primary education in all 
countries by 2015. 
6. Net Enrolment in Primary Education 
7. Proportion of cohort reaching grade 5 
8. Literacy Rate of 15 to 24 Year-Olds 
Promote gender equality 
Ensure that boys and girls have equal access to 
primary and secondary education by 2005, if 
possible, and at all levels by 2015. 
9. Ratio of Girls to Boys in Primary & Secondary 
Education 
10. Ratio of Literate Females to Males (15 to 24 
Year-Olds) 
11. Ratio of female to male employment in 
nonagricultural occupations 
12. Proportion of women in national parliaments 
Reduce infant & child mortality 
The death rates for infants and children under the age 
of five years should be reduced by two-thirds the 
1990 level by 2015.  
13. Infant Mortality Rate 
14. Under 5 Mortality Rate 
15. Immunization rate for measles among under-1 
year olds 
Improve maternal health 
Reduce maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters 
between 1990 and 2015.  
16. Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 
17. Maternal mortality ratio 
18. Proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel 
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other major 
diseases 
Halt and begin to reverse  the spread of HIV/AIDS 
by 2015. 
 
Halt and begin to reverse the scourge of malaria and 
other major diseases that affect humanity by 2015. 
19. Prevalence of HIV/AIDS among 15-24 year olds 
 
(It was agreed to leave the precise wording of the 
target and suggestions for additional indicators until 
the HIV/AIDS conference, currently underway, 
makes its recommendations. Further consultation is 
also needed on indicators for the other targets.) 
Environmental sustainability and regeneration   
Ensure environmental sustainability 
Stop the unsustainable use of natural resources and 
reduce by half the proportion of the population 
without access to an improved water source between 
1990 and 2015. 
 
Achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020  
20. Proportion of population with access to an 
improved water source 
21. Proportion of population with access to an 
improved sanitation facility 
22. Forest area as proportion of national surface area 
23. Biodiversity: protected land area 
24. GDP per unit of energy use  
25. Carbon dioxide emissions 
   6 
2. TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND POVERTY SINCE 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
2.1 THE POSITION AT INDEPENDENCE 
 
High levels of social expenditure
5 and low wage differentials
6 meant that the distribution 
of income within the Soviet Union was significantly more egalitarian than in most market 
economies (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).  Table 2 shows the position within the 
different Republics prior to independence. Levels of income inequality were generally 
low, with only Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan experiencing Gini 
coefficients of over 0.3. Average per capita income within the CIS-7 was also 
considerably lower than in Russia - varying from under half in Tajikistan to 84 percent in 
Georgia. This difference is explained in part by the higher fertility and larger average 
household size of the republics in Central Asia, which reduces average household income 
when measured on a per capita basis. However, there is no doubt that the Central Asian 
Republics were amongst the least well-off republics in the Union.  
 
Table 2 Summary statistics on the distribution of per capita income and poverty within 
the Soviet Union by Republic, 1989 
  Gini coeff 
1  Mean per capita 
income 
2 
(Roubles) 
 Mean relative 
to Russia 
Percent of population 
with per capita income 
below 75 Rbs, 1989 
Russia  0.278  178.65  100  5.0 
Lithuania  0.278  201.93  113  2.3 
Latvia  0.274  198.72  111  2.4 
Estonia  0.299  219.18  123  1.9 
Ukraine  0.235  153.35  86  6.0 
Belarus  0.238  170.29  95  3.3 
Moldova  0.258  141.33  79  11.8 
Georgia  0.292  150.15  84  13.0 
Armenia  0.259  134.85  75  14.3 
Azerbaijan  0.328  110.33  62  33.6 
Kazakhstan  0.289  142.92  80  15.5 
Kyrgyzstan  0.287  104.06  58  32.9 
Tajikistan  0.308  82.94  46  51.2 
Turkmenistan  0.307  102.26  57  35.0 
Uzbekistan  0.304  91.29  51  43.6 
ALL USSR  0.289  158.83  89  11.0 
Notes: 
1 The Gini coefficient is a summary measure of inequality. 0.00 implies perfect equality where every 
observation has the same income; 1.00 perfect inequality where the last observation has all the income.  
2 Monthly per capita gross household income for workers and collective farm workers. 
Source: Tables 8.4 and UI3, Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992. 
 
                                                  
5 Social transfers made up 14 percent of total gross income in the 1988 USSR Family Budget Survey. 
6 It is generally agreed that rates of return to education in the Soviet Union were less than in market 
economies and consequently the difference between non-manual and manual workers was lower than in the 
West (Rutkowski, 1995).   7 
Poverty did not officially exist under the Soviet system, although there were 
‘maloobespechenny’ (or ‘under-provisioned’) families (Braithwaite, 1995). The concept 
of a subsistence minimum to determine who was under-provisioned was not used. Instead 
a ‘minimum consumption basket’ that reflected the socially acceptable minimum for a 
community was applied
7.  In 1989 the national ‘social minimum’ calculated by 
Goskomstat was around 81 rubles per month.  Using data from the 1988 USSR Family 
Budget Survey and taking 75 rubles as a proxy for the national ‘poverty threshold’, 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) estimated that around 31 million people, or 11 percent 
of the total population of the Soviet Union, were poor by this standard. The proportion 
living in poverty however varied considerably across the Republics, with over half of 
those living in Tajikistan having a per capita income of less than 75 rubles, compared to 
just 2 percent in Estonia. Prior to independence, the CIS-7 could be divided into two 
groups: Moldova, Georgia and Armenia – where inequality and poverty were relatively 
low (12-14%); and the Central Asian Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
plus Azerbaijan where inequality was higher than the Union average and where between 
a third and a half of the population were ‘poor’.  
 
2.2 SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
2.2.1 Rising Income Inequality 
 
The decline in measured output shown in Figure 1 has been accompanied by increases in 
measured inequality right across the region (Table 3). By the end of the 1990s most of the 
CIS-7 countries displayed values that were well above even the top of the OECD range 
(the most unequal OECD country in the 1980s was USA with a Gini coefficient of 0.37)). 
The increase has been particularly marked in Armenia where in 1998/9 the income gini 
coefficient reached 0.57, a level akin to those found amongst the more unequal Latin 
American countries such as Brazil (0.61) and Chile (0.57). Moreover, these changes have 
taken place at an unprecedented speed, which has resulted in an acute sense of relative 
deprivation for those at the bottom of the distribution. When asked to place themselves 
on a nine step ladder, bearing in mind that poorest were on the first step and the richest 
on the ninth step, the majority in Tajikistan ranked themselves as being on the bottom 
third of the ladder, with 11 percent extremely poor (rung 1), 23 percent on rung 2 and 31 
percent on rung 3 (Falkingham, 2000). Opinion poll data from 1999 for several 
Transition countries showed that the majority of people think that income differences are 
now too high in their country (Redmond, Schnepf and Suhrcke, 2001). 
 
                                                  
7  This basket allowed for a generous level of consumption of both food and non-food items and contained 
relatively high proportions of high cost foods such as animal fat and meat .   8 
Table 3: Gini coefficient of per capita income, CIS-7 1989-2000 
  1989  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
             
Armenia  0.251  0.42            0.57      
Azerbaijan  0.308                      0.30 
Georgia  0.28            0.50           
Kyrgyzstan  0.27            0.41  0.40  0.41 
Moldova  0.251       0.46            0.44 
Tajikistan  0.281                 0.47      
Uzbekistan  0.28                       
Notes: Data refer to the distribution of individuals according to household per capita income.  
Sources: 1989: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992); other years Transmonee database, except for Armenia 
1999 (World Bank, 2002a) 
 
Some commentators have questioned whether comparisons of inequality indices before 
and after the transition are meaningful (World Bank, 2000a). Certainly, as Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992) acknowledge, their 1989 estimates may  underestimate income 
disparities in 1989 as the old Family Budget Survey (FBS) on which they are based was 
known to exclude individuals at both ends of the distribution. However, the FBS also 
failed to capture imputed income from the extensive benefits in kind provided by state 
enterprises and local authorities8. It is unclear what effect the inclusion of these would 
have had, although work in OECD countries has found that final income is more equally 
distributed than original or gross income (Gardiner et al, 1995). Thus, even if the exact 
magnitude is hard to measure, there can be no doubt that there has been a significant shift 
in the distribution of resources within society over the last ten years and a widening of the 
gap between those at the top and the bottom of the distribution. 
2.2.2 Falling real wages and rising wage differentials 
 
A number of factors have contributed to the widening of the income distribution during 
transition, including a shift in the composition of income.  In the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s, only 14 percent of total gross income was from private sources (including 7 
percent  from self-employment), whilst social transfers comprised 13 percent, labour 
incomes 72 percent and income from property was non-existent (Milanovic, 1998). By 
2001 income from wage employment comprised just 44 percent of monthly per capita 
income in Azerbaijan (World Bank, 2002b) and 38 percent in Kyrgyzstan.  As we noted 
earlier, informal sector activity has grown rapidly during transition. Much of this has 
been small scale ‘survival’ activities such as working on private plots, petty street trade 
and unofficial taxis, undertaken in the absence of formal work opportunities, sufficient 
wages or a function social security system subsistence (Bernabe, 2002).  
 
                                                  
8 There were substantial in-kind benefits by way of subsidised housing, food and utility prices, health, 
education and ‘holidays’ at sanatoria. Although some of these, such as housing, were distributed as a 
function of status and thus regressive, many were universal and could be expected to be progressive.   9 
Table 4: Gini coefficient of earnings, CIS-7 1989-2000 
Country  1989  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
                       
Armenia  0.258  0.296  0.355  0.366  0.321  0.381                      0.486 
Azerbaijan  0.275       0.361       0.428  0.459  0.458  0.462  0.462       0.506 
Georgia  0.301       0.369  0.4                 0.498                
Kyrgyzstan  0.26       0.3  0.445  0.443  0.395  0.428  0.431  0.429  0.466  0.47 
Moldova  0.25       0.411  0.437  0.379  0.39  0.414       0.426  0.441  0.392 
Tajikistan  0.276                                                   
Uzbekistan  0.257                                                   
Notes:. In this table the Gini coefficient is based on the distribution of earning interpolated from group data 
for monthly earnings, with bonuses, for full-time employees as reported by employers. For Moldova, 1993-
2000: excludes Transdniestr   
Sources: 1989: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992); 1991-2000 Transmonne 2002. 
 
Accompanying the growth in income from private sources has been a rise in levels of 
earnings inequality. Table 4 shows that between 1989 and 2000, the Gini coefficient for 
the distribution of monthly earnings increased by over two-thirds in Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia and nearly doubled in Azerbaijan. Although nationally representative data 
allowing calculation of inequality measures are not available for Uzbekistan (World 
Bank, 2002b), Klugman (1998) using data from a survey sponsored by the EU found that 
the decile ratio
9 for all earnings had increased from 3.0 in 1986 to 6.50 in 1995, and that 
decile the ratio for earnings in the state sector was 6.0 as compared to a staggering 8.3 in 
the private sector. 
 
As well as the growth of the importance of private sector and informal earnings, wage 
inequality has also been fuelled by the failure to respect employment contracts leading to 
the widespread practice of wages being paid in arrears, especially for the less well-paid.  
The fall in output and growth of arrears within the state sector has been reflected in a fall 
in average real wages (Figure 2). (N.B. It is notable that the decline in real wages in 
Georgia shown in Figure 2 is significantly less than the decline in measured output in 
Figure 1  – reflecting the importance of informal self-employment. Bernabe (2002) 
estimates that between 30% and 45% of the employed may be working in the informal 
sector, either full-time or as secondary activity). 
 
                                                  
9 The decile ratio is the ratio of the 90
th percentile versus the 10
th percentile. Thus a decile ratio of 3.5 
indicates that the earning of individuals in the  90th percentile of the earnings distribution are three and a 
half times those of individuals in the 10
th percentile.   10 
Figure 2: Trends in real wages 1989-2001
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2.2.3 Material poverty 
 
Given the falls in output and real wages and rising inequality it is not surprising that 
poverty levels have increased. In addition to exacerbating the disadvantage of the ‘old 
poor’ - pensioners, families with large numbers of children and single parent families - 
the economic dislocation of transition has also given rise to new groups of poor, 
including the families of workers ‘on leave without pay’, the long-term unemployed, 
agricultural workers, young people in search of their first job, and a growing number of 
refugees, both economic refugees and persons displaced as a result of civil conflict. 
 
It is difficult to construct a set of poverty statistics that allow comparisons a) across time 
within a country and b) across countries at any one time, as definitions, survey 
methodologies and coverage all vary. Table 5 shows the proportion poor as measured 
against two alternative ‘international’ poverty lines measures in ‘purchasing power 
parity’ (PPP) dollars
10 whilst Table 6 presents  estimates of the proportion of the 
population living in poverty within each country during the 1990s according to nationally 
set poverty lines. 
                                                  
10 A commonly used international definition of absolute poverty is surviving on less than one US dollar per 
person a day. This standard was developed by the World Bank in the 1980s and was based on the average 
of the poverty lines of 10 low income countries, all of which were located wholly, or in part, within the 
tropics.  In its 2000 report on poverty in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, the World Bank argues 
that a higher poverty line is needed in the region, given that its cooler climate necessitates additional 
expenditures on heat, winter clothing and food. A line of US$2.15 a day was therefore taken as a low 
threshold . A higher threshold of US$4.30 was also used, recognising that what may be considered as 
‘subsistence needs’ inevitably varies with the level of a country’s development. Even the poorest 
households in the region will incur expenses on some basic services such as the post, childcare and health 
care and will need to cover the running costs of a minimum of some basic consumer durables, such as a 
(black and white) television or a refrigerator.   11 
 
Table 5 Poverty in the CIS-7 using international poverty standards 
  Survey date Extreme poverty 
(2.15$ PPP/day) 
Total poverty 
(4.30$ PPP/day) 
Total population 
extremely poor 
Total population 
poor 
           
Armenia  1999  43.5  86.2  1,652,000  3,274,000 
Azerbaijan  1999  23.5  64.2  1,868,000  5,103,000 
Georgia  1999  18.9  54.2  1,021,000  2,928,000 
Kyrgyzstan  1998  49.1  84.1  2,360,000  4,042,000 
Moldova  1999  55.4  84.6  2,022,000  3,088,000 
Tajikistan  1999  68.3  95.8  4,099,000  5,749,000 
Uzbekistan        2,233,000  6,700,000 
All CIS-7        15,255,000  30,884,000 
Note: The figure for Uzbekistan on total population living in poverty and extreme poverty is derived using 
poverty rates as quoted in the World Bank poverty report. The actual numbers living below $2 and $4 a day 
ARE  likely to be much higher.  
Source: World Bank (2000a) 
 
At the end of a decade of transition, an estimated 31 million people living in the CIS-7 
countries were living in poverty, of whom 15 million were living in extreme poverty.  
 
It is clear from Table 5 that the problem of low living standards is widespread, with the 
majority of the population in each country living below $4.30PPP a day. In 1999, over 
two-thirds of the population of Tajikistan were surviving on less than  $2.15PP a day, 
along with over half the population of Moldova and just under half the population of 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.  Poverty rates as measured according to national poverty lines 
(Table 6) point to similarly high levels of impoverishment and the ranking of countries 
remains more or less the same (with the exception of Georgia). 
 
For those countries where time series data are available, the proportion of the population 
living in poverty appears to have peaked in 1999 following the aftershock of the Russian 
financial crisis and in the last three years improvements have been seen in all countries, 
with the exception of Georgia where poverty incidence has stabilised but has not yet 
started to recover.  The data over time appears to be consistent with the figures on growth 
in GDP presented in Table 1. In particular, Armenia and Azerbaijan both experienced 
strong economic growth during the last three years and both have recorded significant 
reductions in headcount poverty (although one must be cautious about absolute changes 
as the data from different surveys are not strictly comparable over time). 
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Table 6 Estimates of Proportion of the Population Living in Poverty in the CIS-7 
countries during the 1990s 
  Poverty rate 
(% poor) 
Poverty gap 
(P1) 
Severity of 
 poverty (P2) 
Armenia       
1996  54.7  0.215  0.11 
1998/9  53.7  0.155  0.061 
2001  47.4     
Azerbaijan       
1995   68.1 
1  0.276  0.144 
2001  49.6  0.155  0.067 
Georgia (WB estimates)       
1997  13.7  0.041  0.019 
1998  19.8  0.066  0.033 
1999  23.2  0.074  0.035 
2000  23.1  0.075  0.036 
Georgia (Govt estimates)       
1997   43.6 
2  0.159  0.095 
1998   50.2  0.195  0.112 
1999   51.4  0.203  0.108 
2000   51.4  0.207  0.111 
Kyrgyzstan       
1993  45.4  0.227  0.149 
Fall 1996  51.9  0.200   
1997  51.0  0.180   
1998  63.6  0.247   
1999  64.1  0.250   
2000  62.5  0.211  0.093 
2001  56.4  0.172  0.070 
Moldova       
1997  47.7  0.167  0.081 
1998  61.6  0.251  0.133 
1999  71.1  0.296  0.157 
2000  70.5  0.289  0.151 
2001  62.3  0.241  0.121 
Tajikistan       
1999  95.7  0.574  0.379 
Uzbekistan       
2000/01  27.5 
1     
Notes: Due to changes in welfare indicators, poverty lines and survey methodologies estimates are not 
directly comparable over time.  Unless otherwise shown the welfare indicator is per capita consumption 
and the poverty line is the national subsistence minimum (prozhitochnyi minimum). 
1 Uses consumption aggregate based on food only. 
2 Poverty line is taken as the ‘living wage’. 
Sources: Armenia 1996, 1998/9 World Bank (2002a) Armenia 2001 ‘Poverty measurement in Armenia: 
evidence and new issues’ unpublished presentation in Yerevan, Sept 27
th 2002; Azerbaijan 1995 (World 
Bank, 1997), Azerbaijan 2001 (World Bank (2002b); Georgia Government of Georgia (2000) and World 
Bank (2002c); Kyrgyzstan 1993, World Bank (1995), Kyrgyzstan 1996-1999 Table 3 and 54, World Bank 
(2001), Kyrgyzstan 2000-2001 World Bank (2002d); Moldova 1997-2001 Signoret (2002); Tajikistan 
World Bank (2000b) and Falkingham (2000a); Uzbekistan World Bank (2000e). 
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2.2.4 Poverty and the 1998 Russian Fiscal Crisis 
 
The Russian fiscal crisis of August 1998 affected some countries in the CIS-7 more than 
others. For example, Azerbaijan appears to have been largely immune for any fallout, 
with growth rates in 1999 being only slightly lower than the previous year and quickly 
returning to double figures (Table 1). Azerbaijan was protected by the large share of oil 
revenues in GDP. In contrast, Moldova was especially hard hit, with negative growth 
recorded  in both 1998 and 1999 (Table 1). Russia represents a major market for 
Moldovan exports and these were particularly affected; for example during the first 
quarter of 1999, wine supply (a major food processing activity) was reduced to half the 
volume of the previous year (Moldova Economic Trends, 2001). It is notable from Table 
6 that as some macro-stability was achieved and trading conditions in Moldova started to 
improve in 2000, poverty also started to fall. By 2001, headcount poverty rates appear to 
have returned to their 1998 level, but they remain significantly above their ‘pre-crisis’ 
1997 level. 
 
Subjective assessments of living conditions by Moldovan households corroborate the 
trend of deteriorating living standards from 1997 to 1999 and their stabilisation and 
subsequent improvement during the years 2000 and 2001. When households were asked 
about their living condition, 51 percent of households in 1997 assessed their conditions to 
be below ‘average’, i.e. either bad’ or ‘very bad’. This percentage increased to 54 percent 
in 1998 and 58 percent in 1999. After 1999, however, Moldovan households perceived 
some improvement in their living conditions as the percentage assessing their living 
conditions to be ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ drops to 55 percent and by 2001 it is back at its 1997 
level  (Signoret, 2002). 
 
Kyrgyzstan also experienced a slowdown in real economic growth in 1998, with growth 
rates falling to just 2 percent in 1998, from nearly 10 percent in 1997. However, since 
then the country has benefited from strong economic recovery, with growth exceeding 5 
percent per annum since 2000. Per capita consumption in rural areas was further aided by 
egalitarian land reform and the liberalisation of agricultural markets. As a result poverty 
in Kyrgyzstan fell by 23 percent between 1998 and 2001 (World Bank, 2002c). However, 
despite poverty rates declining, poverty incidence continues to be high.  
 
Georgia’s exports were also hit by the Russia crisis (as were remittances) and recovery 
has been slow (Table 1). Moreover, the positive growth in GDP that has occurred has not 
been translated into improvements in living conditions. This is because growth has 
largely been confined to a narrow set of sectors, i.e. communications and financial 
intermediation, whose aggregate share in total employment is less than 5 percent. 
Regardless of which definition of poverty is used, poverty in Georgia increased 
unambiguously and significantly during the period 1997-2000, with most of the increase 
occurring in 1998 and 1999 (Table 6) and rates stagnating in 2000.  
 
There is some evidence that the economic ‘shock’ following the Russian financial crisis 
affected different groups differently. Between 1997 and 1998 in Kyrgyzstan, mean 
consumption fell by 33 percent (and median consumption by 26 percent) (Falkingham,   14 
Namazie and Siyam, 2002).  The greatest proportionate falls were experienced by those 
households at the  top end of the distribution, with the top quintile suffering a loss of 
almost two-fifths on the previous year
11.  The same picture was observed in Moldova, 
with those households that were relatively well off being relatively more affected by the 
economic shock than the less well off (Signoret and Murrugarra, 2002). Such households 
included those who had benefited disproportionately from the period of growth prior to 
the crisis – the self-employed and private sector workers; the impact of the crisis was to 
wipe out their previous welfare gains. In Armenia, the effect of the shock was relatively 
short lived, and disproportionately a ffected those living in urban area (World Bank, 
2002a). 
 
In Georgia, however, a slightly different picture emerges. Table 6 shows, at least for the 
World Bank estimates, that the sharpest increase is in the measure of poverty severity 
(P2), that is the measure capturing the inequality among the poor – indicating that the 
poorest of the poor are becoming even poorer (World Bank 2002c). 
 
                                                  
11 Falkingham et al (2002) found that the bulk of the shock of the fiscal crisis in 1998 in Kyrgyzstan was 
borne by households living in and around the capital of Bishkek and Chui, where proportionate increases in 
vulnerability between 1997 and 1998 were significantly above the national average.   15 
3.  WHO ARE THE POOR? WHICH GROUPS ARE MOST AT RISK 
OF POVERTY? 
A critical question if poverty is to be reduced is which groups in society are most at risk 
of being or becoming poor. In the past, ‘under-provisioned’ families were typically 
portrayed as pensioners living alone, single parent families or families with large 
numbers of children (Braithwaite, 1995). Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) also found 
that poverty was higher amongst collective farm households, although this may be the 
result of understatement of income from private plots. The growing availability of 
household survey data mean that it is possible to establish a detailed socio-economic 
profile of the poor in each of the CIS-7 countries. A number of common characteristics 
associated with an elevated risk of poverty emerge. 
3.1 LOCATION 
Urban-rural differentials in poverty are marked, with the size and direction of the 
differential being related to the degree of urbanisation within the country. In the most 
urbanised of the CIS-7 countries, Azerbaijan
12 Armenia and Georgia, households living 
in urban areas experience a higher risk of being poor than those in rural areas. For 
example, 59 percent of the urban population in Armenia was poor compared to 48 
percent in rural areas in 1998/9 (World Bank, 2002a).  In contrast, in countries where 
over half the population live in rural areas, it appears that urban households experience a 
lower risk of poverty than those in rural areas.  
 
Table 7 Rural – urban differentials in poverty  
 
Headcount poverty rates    Survey 
date  Urban  Rural  
Share of population living 
in rural areas 
         
Armenia  1998/9  55.0  40.6  32.8 
  2001*  48.0  46.4   
Georgia  1999  59.3  41.1  43.7 
Kyrgyzstan  2001  45.4  62.4  65.6 
Moldova  1997  17.2 
1  21.1  58.4 
Tajikistan  1999  79.4  99.5  72.4 
Uzbekistan  2001  22.5  30.5  63.3 
* preliminary and unpublished findings 
1 excludes capital of Chisinau, where poverty incidence was estimated as 6.7 percent. 
Sources: Headcount poverty rates: GOG (2000), World Bank (1999b) (2000b) (2001) (2002a) (2002d) 
(2002e); Share of population living in rural areas: UNDP (2002). 
 
A number of factors have been put forward to explain the pattern of poverty in Armenia, 
some of which may also be relevant elsewhere. First Armenia experienced early and 
relatively egalitarian land reform. Collective and state owned land was redistributed to 
                                                  
12 According to the 2002 poverty assessment, headcount poverty in Baku City was 50 percent compared 
with around 60 percent in other urban areas and just over 40 percent in rural areas.   16 
the rural population in 1995, and access to land has provided a self-protection mechanism 
for rural households, allowing them to grow at least some food for their own 
consumption. In contrast urban households did not have such a coping mechanism. 
Secondly, as discussed above, urban households were more affected by the financial 
crisis in Russia. This was especially the case in Armenia as many urban households have 
relied on migration as an income diversification strategy; remittances account for, on 
average, 17 percent of total household income in urban areas compared to just 4 percent 
in rural areas (World Bank, 2002a). Remittances received a double setback in 1998 as 
migrant workers in Russia were directly affected by the crisis and their reduced 
remittances then lost further value because of the Russian rou ble devaluation. However, 
according to preliminary results from the 2001 Armenia household survey (shown in 
Table 7), the rural-urban gap appears to have narrowed over the last three years – at the 
expense of the rural population. The incidence of poverty  in rural areas has increased 
whilst urban poverty has declined. 
 
In countries where the majority of the population live in rural areas, reliance on income 
agriculture offers no guarantee against poverty. In Kyrgyzstan, rural poverty continues to 
be significantly higher than urban poverty, with headcount poverty rate being 1.4 times 
higher in rural than urban areas in 2001 (62% v 45%) (World Bank, 2002d). This is 
despite the recent high growth rate in agriculture that accompanied land reform in the late 
1990s.  
 
Inhabitants of small towns, without the employment opportunities of larger cities and 
reduced possibilities to engage in subsistence agriculture for food consumption, have also 
been found to face an increased risk of poverty. In Moldova, in 2001, 80 percent of the 
population in small towns were found to be living in poverty compared with 64 percent in 
rural areas and 44 percent in large cities (Figure 3, from Signoret, 2002). Residents of 
one-company towns - where the entire labour force was dependent on one or a few 
enterprises during Soviet times  - face particular difficulties. As a result of the 
restructuring or closure of these enterprises local unemployment rates may be extremely 
high, those still working are often subject to short hours or administrative leave and the 
prospects for alternative work are bleak.  
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Figure 3: Poverty rates by region, 
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From this discussion, it is clear that both urban and rural poverty continue to represent a 
substantial challenge in all countries. In urban areas, poverty is often associated with 
falling employment opportunities and earnings in the formal economy, reflecting the 
ongoing restructuring of the industrial complex inherited from the Soviet era. So far, 
outside of the capital cities, it appears that the emerging private sector in the urban areas 
has been too small to compensate for the collapsed industrial base. Sustainable poverty 
reduction will depend upon enhanced employment creation within a vibrant private 
sector. 
 
Rural poverty is of a different nature. Agriculture remains the major source of income 
amongst rural households, and subsistence agriculture is increasingly important in 
sustaining living standards.  However access to land appears to be no guarantee of 
avoiding poverty, especially in the highly agrarian countries of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, and it is clear that rural poverty reduction strategies need to focus on 
improving the incomes from agriculture of the rural poor. This will involve removing 
physical, logistical and administrative barriers regarding access to produce markets  - 
including reducing the unofficial tariffs ‘imposed’ by local government inspectors and 
other officials
13 - as well as improvements in the technology of agricultural production. 
Moreover, rural households often face inadequate a ccess to basic services and 
infrastructure (particularly water and sewerage), and investments are urgently needed to 
address these deficiencies.  
3.2 HOUSEHOLD SIZE & DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION 
A common finding across the region (and elsewhere) is that the risk of poverty increases 
with household size. Poor households are generally larger than non-poor households. 
However, the relationship between poverty and household size is not straightforward. It 
                                                  
13 See the paper by Dethier (2002) for a full discussion of the problems posed to poverty reduction within 
the CIS-7 by poor governance.   18 
would be expected that an increase in the number of adults would tend to reduce the risk 
of household poverty since the number of adults should affect the earnings potential of 
the household. This is indeed found to be the case in Kyrgyzstan with individuals from 
households with 3-4 adults having lower relative pov erty rates than individuals with only 
two adults, no matter how many children are also present in the household (Ackland and 
Falkingham, 1997). Therefore, it is households with  a large number of children, 
particularly pre-school children,   (rather than people) that are often most at risk of 
poverty. 
 
Figure 4: Headcount poverty rate and number of 
children, Kyrgyzstan 2001
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Several factors explain why poverty increases with the number of children in the family. 
First, the presence of children reduces the probability of employment among women. 
Second, large family size is associated with other characteristics, such as low education, 
which in turn result in low earnings. And, third, households with more children simply 
have more mouths to feed. Thus, as household size increases, total income adjusted for 
needs declines (World Bank, 2000a). 
 
Interestingly, recent analysis of household survey data in Azerbaijan found the number of 
children per household to be a weak discriminator of the risk of being poor (World Bank 
2002b). It has been suggested that this reflects the fact that Azerai children tend to live in 
extended households, where grandparents take care of the children. The 1999 Georgian 
Poverty Assessment also highlighted the shift during the 1990s from the modern nuclear 
family to a more traditional multi-generational family as the main living arrangement for 
Georgian households (World Bank, 1999a). Indeed, analysis of the 1996/7 Survey of 
Georgian Households found that children were among those demographic groups with a 
relatively  low risk of poverty, being protected by complex private safety net 
arrangements. However since then, although the extended family remains the dominant 
form of Georgian household, private arrangements protecting children appear to have 
been put under strain (see Figure 9 and Table on child nutritional status below). 
 
Surprisingly, pensioners in general were not found to face a significantly higher risk of 
poverty. In fact, in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 the presence of pensioners in a household was   19 
associated with a lower risk of poverty, particularly in rural areas (World Bank, 2002d). 
On the face of it therefore it appears that pensions may be acting as a protective factor 
helping to keep older people out of poverty. However, we should be careful about 
drawing conclusions from this, as pensioners are not a homogeneous group.  Pensioners 
who live alone and those who have no other source of income other than their pension 
have been found to face a much greater risk of poverty than others (Ackland and 
Falkingham, 1997; Falkingham 2000a).  
 
3.3.  EDUCATION  
In theory one would expect an association between a household’s ability to avoid poverty 
and its asset holdings - including it’s human capital. In studies elsewhere in the World, it 
is common to find a strong correlation between level of education and poverty. However 
many of the early poverty assessments in the CIS found there to be little or only a weak 
association (Ackland and Falkingham, 1997). This reflected both the magnitude of the 
economic dislocation associated with transition to a market economy, with all groups 
being hit regardless of education, and the perverse incentives within the labour market 
towards human capital acquisition during the Soviet period. Under the Soviet system 
many of the best educated (such as teachers and professional workers) experienced lower 
pay and those with less education (e.g. factory workers, miners), and pay scales in 
general were compressed. 
 
The relative advantage conferred by primary and secondary education within the CIS-7 
remains low in comparison to OECD and Central and Eastern European countries (World 
Bank, 2000a). However there are signs that things are changing.  For example, in 
Armenia, education of the household head was found to be associated with increased 
consumption, and gains were higher for those with technical secondary and higher 
education (Figure 5) (World Bank, 2002a). In Uzbekistan families where the head has 
higher education were half as likely to be poor as those where the head had nine or fewer 
years of education (World Bank, 2002e). Living in a household headed by a person with 
higher education reduced the risk of being poor from 50 percent to just 42 percent in 
Azerbaijan in 2001 (World Bank, 2002b). 
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Figure 5: Consumption gain by education, Armenia 
1998/9 (Reference group = primary education only)
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Education was also found to be a protective factor in reducing the negative impact of the 
economic shock associated with the Russian crisis in both Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, with 
households with a head with vocational and technical education suffering less than others 
(World Bank, 2002c; Falkingham et al 2002).  It is likely that as the labour market 
becomes more efficient, the link between education and earnings will strengthen. Given 
this, it is vitally important that children from poor households are guaranteed the 
opportunity to benefit from education, an opportunity that appears to be under threat (see 
Section 4.2 below). 
3.4 EMPLOYMENT 
Early poverty assessments also found that employment was not a guarantee against 
poverty, although having a job appeared to better than being unemployed or not in the 
labour force at all (Ackland and Falkingham, 1997). Low differentials in poverty rates 
between workers and the unemployed, reflected substantial wage arrears and large 
numbers on workers on unpaid leave or short time
14 and in all countries a substantial 
group of new poor emerged – the ‘working poor’.  
 
Labour hoarding throughout the region has been significant. Many enterprises have 
adjusted wages and hours rather than employment. Thus although official unemployment 
rates remain low, there is a substantial mass of concealed unemployment. Wage arrears 
reached epidemic proportions in many of the CIS-7 by the end of the 1990s. Arrears in 
the public sector alone were equivalent to 1 percent of GDP in Georgia, 1.6 percent in 
Moldova and 2.7 percent in Armenia a t the end of 1999 (World Bank, 2000a). In 
Tajikistan in 1999 it is estimated that more than 35 percent of the workforce suffered 
from some wage arrears (World Bank, 2000b). The earnings of the poor are more subject 
to delays than others. Yemtsov (1999) in analysis of the Survey of Georgian Households 
                                                  
14 They may also be due in part to the under-reporting of wage income and the growing role of informal 
sector activities in protecting living standards.   21 
found that 22 percent of poor wage earners were owed back pay by their employers 
compared with 8 percent of the non-poor. 
 
Despite late payment many workers have been slow to leave their jobs. In part this is 
because there are few opportunities elsewhere. Employees also stay as they have access 
to other job-related benefits, particularly housing. People also continue to work to 
preserve routine and to maintain their sense of self-respect. And there is always the hope 
that the enterprise will revive and become viable again. 
3.5 REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS  
Unfortunately armed conflict has affected all of the CIS-7 countries at some stage since 
1989. Up to a million people have had to flee their homes and, even though many of them 
have returned, there are still hundreds of thousands of people registered as internally 
displaced within their countries or living as refugees in foreign countries (Table 8). In 
2001 there were over a quarter of a million refugees registered in Armenia, over half a 
million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan and a further quarter of a 
million in Georgia (UNHCR, 2002). The region has also been affected by the recent 
conflict in Afghanistan, with refugees seeking s afety in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  Georgia also has a growing number of refugees from neighbouring 
Chechnya. An estimated 8,000 Chechen refugees are currently living in the Pankisi 
valley, the vast majority of whom are women, children and elderly.  
 
Refugees and internally displaced persons are particularly vulnerable to poverty, often 
having experienced loss of property and harsh living conditions in collective centres.  
They may also experience discrimination in the job market. Children are particularly hard 
hit by armed conflict. The consequences for them include disruption of schooling, stress 
and exposure to war trauma, loss of family and poverty (UNICEF, 2001).  
 
Table 8 Refugees & Internally displaced Persons in the CIS-7, 2001 
  Refugees Internally Displaced Persons 
     
Armenia  264,300   
Azerbaijan  6,900 
1  580,400 
Georgia  7,900  264,200 
Kyrgyzstan  9,700   
Tajikistan  18,000 
2   
Uzbekistan  41,000   
Notes: 
1 Includes 6,500 asylum seekers; 
2 Of whom 2,300 are returned refugees. Source: UNHCR (2002)   22 
 
Box 2: Armed conflicts in the CIS-7 
 
 
•  Armenia and Azerbaijan 1988-94. As a result of the war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh about 
one million people have been uprooted from their homes. 
•  Central Asia: the Ferghana Valley, 1989-91. There has been on-going tension in the Ferghana Valley, 
which straddles the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Events escalated in 1989 when 
violent outbreaks led to hundreds of deaths and extensive damage to property. 
•  Georgia, 1990-94. Fighting in South Ossetia in late 1990 resulted in the displacement of 50,000-90,000 
people. This was followed by conflict in Abkhazia when hundreds of thousands were uprooted. The 
situation began to stabilise in 1994, although permanent political settlement remains elusive. 
•  Moldova 1992. Following a short and intense conflict, the country split with the area of Transdniestr 
declaring independence.  Transdniestr contains much of the industrial base of the country. 
•  Tajikistan 1992-97. The civil war in 1992-3 was followed by continuous unrest until the signing of the 
peace accord in 1997. It is estimated that during this period 50,000 lost their lives and up to 700,000 
people were displaced. Intermittent unrest continues and refugees continue to return from other 
countries of the CIS. 
 
 
Despite the numerical importance of IDPs within the region, relatively little is known 
about their poverty status. In May 2000 a special survey of IDPS was conducted in 
Georgia under the auspices of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IRCRC). Not surprisingly, it found that IDPs experienced a 
substantial disadvantage with respect to ownership of productive assets (especially land) 
and employment opportunities. However this disadvantage was compensated by 
relatively higher receipt of various assistance programs run by the State and NGOs, with 
the result that there were no significant differences in terms of measured consumption 
levels between IDPs and the local population (World Bank, 2002c). However, the survey 
failed to measure in-kind consumption, which depends crucially upon access to land. 
Once this is taken into account, it is estimated that IDPs in Georgia face an excess risk of 
poverty a third higher than for other groups. A joint WFP/UNHCR survey on food 
security in Armenia showed that severe malnutrition among children was significantly 
higher within the refugee population than in the local population. 
 
An estimated 280,500 ethnic Armenian who fled Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992 are 
still registered as refugees, including 44,000 children. The ethnic Armenian refuges enjoy 
virtually the same legal and social rights as the local population, including free access to 
education, work, social assistance and the courts.  From April 2000 they have been 
allowed to participate in local government elections and legislation in December 2000 
extended the right to purchase apartments and other property without losing entitlement 
to temporary shelter. However although refuges enjoy the same rights as the local 
population, they also experience the same socio-economic difficulties. 
 
Azerbaijan is home to the largest group of displaced persons in the region, with 580,000 
registered IDPs. Most of the displaced are settled in areas close to the cease-fire line, 
while about a third have moved further to the capital. Pending a resolution to the conflict 
many remain in a precarious condition, still living in the temporary refugee camps where 
they were placed after fleeing the war in Nagorno Karabakh. The government has been   23 
reluctant to resettle refugees and only in 2001 was clearance finally given for 150 refugee 
families to be permanently resettled on land in the southeast of the country.  Refugees 
have already been resettled in villages won back from the Armenians in the last months 
of the war, but this marked a breakthrough because it is was the first time anyone had 
been settled permanently outside the war zone (UNHCR, 2001). In general living 
conditions within the camps have been poor, with inadequate water and sanitation 
facilities and IDPs are typically dependent on subsidies and pensions from the 
Government and assistance from humanitarian organisations. In 1999 the World Food 
Program (WFP) provided support to 300,000 beneficiaries. However foreign aid 
agencies, which have supplied food and materials for refugee camps for years are 
downscaling their activities In 2002 the WFP expects to give assistance to just 70,000 
beneficiaries (World Bank, 2002b). 
 
In 1997, the World Bank Poverty Assessment in Azerbaijan (World Bank, 1997) found 
that IDPs were 28 percent more likely to be poor than the population in general and, 
strikingly, were 90 percent more likely to be very poor. However according to the results 
of special survey conducted in 2002 designed specifically to collect information on the 
living conditions of IDPs within Azerbaijan, IDPs do not appear to have significantly 
lower incomes than other groups in Azeri society. Infact IDPs outside Baku actually 
enjoy total consumption levels that are 18 percent higher than the residents surrounding 
them, and have a much lower chance of being poor (35 percent versus 64 percent) or of 
being extremely poor (14 percent versus 34 percent).  IDPs in Baku had lower average 
consumption but faced virtually the same risk of poverty as  other residents of Baku. 
When the IDP data was broken down by type of shelter, only IDPs living in collective 
centre in Baku and IDPs living in public buildings/school elsewhere were found to have 
higher risks of extreme poverty (World Bank, 2002b). 
 
There are several explanations for these unexpected results. This was the first survey to 
include the estimated cash value of electricity exemptions as part of the income of IDPs. 
The survey was also conducted during the summer when IDP incomes may be at their 
highest as IDPs are dependent on seasonal labour which peaks in the summer months, 
with the result that annual incomes are overestimated. Finally the findings may actually 
reflect a real improvement in the situation. The value of Government assistance (or 
‘bread money’) has increased five-fold in current terms, from AZM 5,000 a month in 
1997 to AZM 25,000 in 2002. Given Azerbaijan actually experienced deflation in 1998 
and 1999, this represents an even greater increase in real terms. 
 
IDPs remain more vulnerable to poverty being twice as likely to be unemployed as 
others, with less access to productive land and other assets. Seventy-nine percent of IDPs 
reported that they had had livestock before displacement, but only 12 percent were able 
to bring their livestock with them to the current territory of Azerbaijan. The lack of fixed 
property means that IDPs have little or no collateral to start or expand businesses and no 
major asset to sell in case of emergencies. 
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4.  TRENDS IN CAPABILITY POVERTY 
It has sometimes been argued that estimates of output in transition economies are 
unreliable and that the declines in income and rises in poverty are exaggerated (Griffin, 
1998). It is useful, from this point alone, to look at other types of evidence concerning 
other dimensions of poverty to get a fuller picture of the changes in welfare during 
transition. Capability poverty focuses on an individual’s capacity to live a healthy life, 
free of avoidable morbidity, having adequately nourishment, being informed and 
knowledgeable, being capable of reproduction, enjoying personal security, and being able 
to freely and actively participate in society (Sen, 1999). Material resources at some level 
are generally necessary for some of these activities but they alone are not sufficient. 
Therefore capability poverty may be thought of as going beyond income poverty in terms 
of measuring actual well-being.  
 
Capability poverty can be measured directly in terms of capabilities themselves: e.g. the 
percentage of children who are underweight or the percentage of adults who are illiterate; 
or indirectly in terms of access to opportunities, or the means of capabilities, such as 
access to trained health personal at birth, and access to education and other public 
services. A combination of such direct and indirect measures have been put forward as 
the key indicators of progress towards the MDGs (see Box 1 above). Trends in these 
Millenium Development Indicators (MDIs) and other measures of capacity poverty are 
reviewed below. Before turning to these, however, it is useful to remind ourselves of the 
fiscal context within which social services such as health and education are being 
delivered.  
 
Figure 6: General government expenditures 
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Figure 6 shows the change in the level of general government spending as a percentage of 
GDP over the last decade. Since one of the ‘purposes’ of transition is to reduce the once 
all-encompassing role of the state, a decrease in government spending is to be expected. 
However in a number of countries the share of government spending is now so low that 
the functioning of vital state services may be impaired. Furthermore it is important to 
remember that social spending comprises a shrinking share of a significantly reduced real 
GDP (Figure 1 above). Public expenditure on health and education are now at critically 
low levels in Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. Most OECD governments spend around 
5-7 percent of GDP on health care. With the fall in government expenditure, private 
spending has necessarily increased. However the introduction of charges for health care, 
textbooks, school lunches and the increasing cost of public transport all mean that access 
to basic social services has been severely eroded in all CIS7 countries, and it is likely that 
this will be reflected in a deterioration of the indicators of capability poverty over time. 
 
Table 9 Public expenditure on health and education as a percentage of GDP, CIS-7, 1990-
2000 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Public expenditure on health care as % GDP 
Armenia  2.4  3.2  4.4  3.2  2.1  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6          
Azerbaijan  2.3  3  2.2  5.1  2.3  1.2  2.3  1.9  2.2  1.9     
Georgia  3.1  3.5  2.2  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.8  1.1  1.1  0.6  0.4 
Kyrgyzstan            3.4      3.3  3.8  3.1  3.2  2.6  2.1     
Moldova       3.9  3.1  4.5  6.2  5.8  6.9  6  4.3  2.9  3 
Tajikistan                 3.4  2.5  1  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.6 
Uzbekistan       5.9      4.8  4.6  3.4  3.1  3  3.3  2.9  3 
                       
Public expenditure on education as % GDP 
Armenia       7.5  8.9  5.2  2.5  3.3  2  1.7  1.8  1.9     
Azerbaijan       6.9  6.7  7.6  4.9  3.5  3.7  3.6  3.6  4.2     
Georgia  6.1  6.4  4  0.6  0.5  0.9  1.2  1.3  2.2  1.9     
Kyrgyzstan       6  5  4.2  6.1  6.6  5.2  4.9  4.9  4.1  3.5 
Moldova            7.8  6  7.4  7.7  9.4  8.9  6.3  5.4     
Tajikistan                           2.4  2.2  1.9  2.2  2.1  2.3 
Uzbekistan                       
Notes: Public expenditures represent current and capital expenditures on health and education by local, 
regional and national governments, including municipalities. Household contributions are normally 
excluded. 
Source: UNICEF Transmonee Database 2002. 
 
4.1 HEALTH 
4.1.1 Mortality 
Health poverty can be defined in several ways. The most fundamental measure of the 
well-being of a population is how long its members can expect to live on average. Table 
10 shows life expectancy at birth for both men and women in the CIS-7 across the last 
decade. Life expectancy at birth is a hypothetical measure, giving the number of years a   26 
man or woman could expect to live, on average, if they were exposed to the risk of dying 
at the prevailing age-specific mortality rates throughout their entire life. The measure is 
hypothetical as no one individual lives their entire life in one calendar year, and it is 
sensitive to short term changes in mortality rates. From the table, it is clear that the health 
of the population deteriorated in most of the CIS-7 during the period 1990-1995, with 
declines in life expectancy for women in four of the seven countries and declines for men 
in five countries. Since the mid 1990s however mortality appears to have begun to 
improve. 
 
Table 10 Life expectancy at birth (years), CIS-7, 1989-2000. 
 
  Women  Men 
  1989  1995  2000  1989  1995  2000 
Armenia  74.7  75.9  74.5  69.0  68.9  70.5 
Azerbaijan  74.2  72.9  75.1  66.6  65.2  68.6 
Georgia  75.7  80.6  78.1  68.1  72.6  73.0 
Kyrgyzstan  72.4  70.4  72.4  64.3  61.4  64.9 
Moldova  72.3  69.7  71.2  65.5  61.8  63.9 
Tajikistan  71.8  69.1  70.8 
1  66.7  63.6  66.1 
1 
Uzbekistan  72.1  72.6  73.0 
2  66.0  67.8  68.2 
2 
Notes: 
1 1999; 
2 1998 
Source: UNICEF Transmonee Database 2002. 
 
Life expectancy rates are heavily influenced by trends in infant and child mortality. The 
MDGs include reducing child mortality, as measured by both infant and under-five 
deaths, by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 (MDI #13,14, Box 1).  Figure 7 shows 
recent trends in infant mortality across the seven countries using official vital registration 
data.  Taken at face value the graph presents good news. Although infant mortality rates 
in some countries are high by international standards (especially the central Asian 
Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), from the mid 1990s onwards the 
trend has been downwards. However recent research shows that in some countries 
official infant mortality rates appear to be much lower than those estimates from surveys 
that ask women about their reproductive histories (Bos et al, 2002).  
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Figure 7: Trends in infant mortality, 1989-2000
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Table 11 therefore presents a comparison of infant and child mortality rates calculated 
from vital registration data and survey data for selected countries. This confirms that rates 
calculated from survey data are consistently higher than those from official data; in 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan they are over three times as high, reaching levels that are akin 
to those found in India, where infant mortality was 69 per 1,000 live birth in 2000 
(UNDP, 2002) or parts of Africa (Botswana 74/1,000; Zimbabwe 73/1,000 Senegal, 
80/1,000). 
 
Table 11 Comparison of Survey and Vital Registration-based Infant Mortality Rates 
 
  Year of 
Survey 
Ref. 
Year 
IMR  Survey as  
% of VR 
U5MR  Survey as 
% of VR  
      Survey  Vital reg    Survey   Vital reg   
                 
Armenia  2000 (DHS)  1993  51  17  300%  55  22  250% 
    1998  36  15  240%  39  18  217% 
Azerbaijan  2000 (MICS)  1996  76  20  380%  106  31  342% 
Kyrgyzstan  1997 (DHS)  1990  71  30  237%  79  41  193% 
    1995  61  28  218%  72  41  176% 
Tajikistan  2000 (MICS)  1993  89  47  189%  126  84  150% 
  1999 (TLSS)  1998  82  23  357%       
Uzbekistan  1996 (DHS)  1993  49  32  153%  59  48  123% 
  2000 (MICS)  1999  52  20  260%  69  33  209% 
Note: For DHS, reference years are for mid-point of five year reference category 
Source: Vital registration data from Transmonee database, except for Tajikistan 1997, which is from 
NHDR. 
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Several factors have been put forward to explain the discrepancies, including differences 
in the definition of a ‘live birth’ that is sometimes applied
15 and the decline in the 
proportion of a ll births registered as a result of increased fees. The fees for the 
registration of a birth are now equivalent around three percent of average monthly wages 
in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, ten percent in Georgia and a staggering 53 percent in 
Tajikistan (UNICEF, 2002).  Given this, it is not surprising that a recent survey found 
that only 75 percent of children under 5 in Tajikistan had been included in the civil 
registers, implying that about 190,000 children are missing from the registration system 
(UNICEF, 2002). If a birth is not registered then it is likely that the death will not be 
registered either. Although these factors go someway to explaining the discrepancies, 
more analysis is required to determine the true picture. However, as the data on child 
nutritional status presented below demonstrates, it is likely that infant and child mortality 
and morbidity is significantly worse that suggested by official data. 
 
Data on adult mortality is more reliable. The ‘mortality crisis’ amongst Russian men has 
attracted considerable attention (Chen et al, 1996; Cornia and Pannccia, 1995), with 
much being written about its causes and the relationship to poverty, unemployment 
depression and, especially, alcohol (McKee, 1999; Shkolnikov et al, 2001; Walberg et al, 
1998). However the fact that male mortality also increased elsewhere in the FSU has 
received less comment. 
 
Figure 8: Male mortality (40-59), CIS-7, 1989-2000
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Adult male mortality rose significantly in the mid 1990s in Moldova and Kyrgyzstan and 
at the end of the decade remained above the pre-transition level. The impact of the civil 
war in Tajikistan is also clearly visible in the data. Indicators of women’s health in the 
CIS-7 are, on average, significantly worse than in developed countries, although they 
                                                  
15 In the Soviet Union premature and low-birth weight infants who survived for seven days or less were not 
included in infant mortality statistics. This Soviet definition is still used to compile official statistics in 
some countries in the region.  It has been estimated that other things being equal this will produce an 
estimate of IMR 20% lower than that using the WHO definition of a live birth (McKee and Chenet 2002).   29 
have followed diverse  paths from each other during economic transition. Maternal 
mortality rates (MMR) are particularly high in Tajikistan, at 74.0 per 100,000 live births 
(1993), Georgia, 56.9 (2000) and Armenia 52.5 (2000). This compares to an average 
MMR of under 10 in most countries of the European Union. Prior to independence, rates 
in Kyrgyzstan were of a similar magnitude to her neighbours, 55.6/100,000 in 1991, but 
since then rates have improved to 33.6 in 1998. This is almost certainly a direct result of 
a new reproductive health programme. Maternal mortality has also fallen significantly in 
Uzbekistan (from 30.1 in 1992 to 14.7 in 1999), again largely the result of increased 
contraceptive use and better reproductive health. 
4.1.2 Nutritional status 
There is a very real concern that the level and depth of income poverty faced by 
households within the region may be affecting children’s nutritional status, with 
subsequent long-term developmental consequences. The UNICEF Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys (MICs) and the USAID funded Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
contain valuable information on the nutritional status of young children (aged under 59 
months) for the Republics in which the surveys have been conducted. Table 12 and 
Figures 9a-d below show information for the three standard indices of physical growth: 
height-for-age (percent stunted reflects chronic undernutrition), weight-for-height 
(percent wasted reflects acute or recent malnutrition), and weight-for-age (percent under-
weight is a good overall indicator of the child population’s nutritional health; MDI #4, 
Box 1). In a healthy, well-nourished population of children, it is expected at 2.3 percent 
of children will fall below two standard deviations of the reference population and will be 
classified as stunted, wasted or underweight. The figures also present data on the 
proportion of children under 5 with moderate or severe anaemia. 
 
Figure 9a: Percentage of children  
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Figure 9b: Percentage of children  
classified as stunted
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Figure 9c: Percentage of children  
classified as wasted
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Figure 9d: Percentage of children  
classified as anaemic
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Table 12 Percentage of children under five severely or moderately undernourished 
  Survey year & type  Underweight 
(weight for age) 
Stunted 
(height for age) 
Wasted 
(weight for height) 
         
Armenia  2000 (DHS)  2.6  13.0  2.0 
Azerbaijan  2000 (MICS)  16.8  19.6  7.9 
Georgia  1999 (MICS)  3.1  11.7  2.3 
Kyrgyzstan 
a  1997 (DHS)  11.0  24.8  3.4 
Tajikistan 
b  2002 (NNS)    30.9  4.9 
Uzbekistan 
a  1996 (DHS)    31.3  11.6 
Note: a rates are for children 0 to 35 months;  b rates are for children 6 to 59 months. 
DHS  – Demographic and Health Survey, MICS – UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, NNS  – 
National Nutritional Survey. 
 
It is clear Table 12 that the nutritional status of children in several of the CIS-7 is a major 
cause for concern. The percentage of children classified as stunted is significantly greater 
than the WHO standard of 2.3 percent in all instances. The rate of stunting in Tajikistan is 
particularly worrying, despite the 2002 figure being an improvement on rates found in 
previous nutritional surveys
16. Furthermore, contrary to expectations that access to food 
would be higher in rural areas and malnutrition concomitantly lower, Figure 9 
demonstrates the reverse, with stunting and wasting actually being worse in rural areas. 
Over a quarter of children under 5 living in rural Kyrgyzstan and nearly a third children 
in rural Uzbekistan exhibit signs of chronic under-nutrition. And around a fifth of rural 
Azeri children have poor nutritional health. 
 
Interestingly, leaving aside the high rates of malnutrition in Uzbekistan
17, a country’s 
rank in Table 12 generally follows its rank in material poverty in Table 5. Countries with 
high levels of material poverty such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have more 
malnourished children. As well as being positively correlated with other indicators of 
well-being at a national level, child nutritional status is also strongly associated with 
indicators of socio-economic status at the household level. Children whose mothers have 
post school education are less likely to suffer from malnutrition  than children whose 
mother have only secondary education or less (Figure 10). There is also a clear gradient 
in nutritional status by household economic status as measured by ownership of selected 
assets, characteristics of the dwelling and access to amenities.  Children from the poorest 
20 percent of households were twice as likely to experience chronic malnutrition i.e. 
stunting than children from the richest 20 percent (27% vs 13%) (UNICEF, 2000). 
 
                                                  
16 In 2001 the prevalence of chronic malnutrition (stunting) in Tajikistan was estimated at 38%.  However 
direct comparison between the two surveys is complicated by the fact that the 2002 survey was conducted 
in May/June whilst the previous survey was conducted in early autumn; a time of year commonly 
associated with high levels of diarrhoeal disease as a result of the changes in water source. 
17 Ismail and Micklewiright (1997) using an alternative dataset report significantly lower levels of 
malnutrition for Uzbekistan which are more in line with other economic indicators for the country.   32 
Figure 10: Child nutrition by mothers education
Azerbaijan 2000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Underweight Stunted Wasted
P
e
r
c
e
n
t Secondary or less
High School
College-vocational
University
 
 
Figure 11: Child nutrition by household 
economic status Azerbaijan 2000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Underweight Stunted Wasted
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Poor
Middle
Rich 
 
 
A key Millennium Development Goal is to reduce child malnutrition by half by 2015.  It 
is clear from the above discussion that it will be necessary to improve both material 
living standards and other dimensions of poverty in order to achieve this. 
4.1.3 Access to health care 
An important determinant of good health is access to good quality health care. During the 
Soviet era, the health care system was characterised by widespread access and high levels 
of service use. Health care provision was extensive and free at the point of delivery. 
However, since independence health services have deteriorated rapidly in the face of 
severe financial constraints, exacerbated in some areas by extensive damage to 
infrastructure during the armed conflicts that have wracked the region. 
 
Trends in the use of health care services over time are difficult to interpret, being affected 
by both demand and supply side factors. It is clear that the widening gap between the   33 
health care budget and the actual costs of care has resulted in both a fall in the quality of 
services and an increased burden on the household both in terms of official charges and, 
more commonly, under-the-counter or informal payments
18. Evidence suggests that 
informal payments for health care are extensive in the CIS-7 (Falkingham, 2002; Lewis, 
2002; chapter by Bonilla-Chacin et al, this volume). Although in principle medical 
supplies and drugs required as part of inpatient treatment remain free, the scarcity of such 
items in medical facilities has led to an increasing number of patients having to purchase 
them. Furthermore, local budgetary constraints and petrol shortages have eroded the 
capacity of the ambulance service, and often patients have to provide their own 
transportation to medical facilities.  Most importantly, informal user charges for 
consultations are frequently being imposed to help subsidise salaries, despite the fact that 
such consultations officially remain free of charge.  
 
There is a small, but growing, body of evidence that the growth of out-of-pocket 
payments is affecting access to health care. In a household survey specially design to 
collect information on the use of, and payment for, health care services in Kyrgzystan 
conducted in 2001, seven percent of men and 12 percent of women reported that they had 
sought medical assistance in the last 30 days (Falkingham, 2001). A further 10 percent of 
men and 16 percent of women reported that they had needed medical assistance but had 
not sought treatment (Figure 12). The main reason given for not seeking health care was 
that the person self-medicated using either pharmaceuticals (57-58%) or herbs (13-14%). 
11 percent of men and 9 percent of women thought that the problem would go away. 
However 14 percent of men and 15 percent of women reported that they did not seek 
medical assistance as it was ‘too expensive’ (Figure 13). Amongst those who consulted, 
total payments for the consultation constituted an average of 8 percent of usual household 
monthly expenditures. However, health care payments represent a greater burden for the 
poor than the rich with health care expenses on average accounting for 10 percent of total 
household expenditures for the poorest households compared to 5 percent amongst the 
richest (Falkingham, 2001). 
Figure 12: Percent seeking health care in last  
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18 Informal payments have been defined by Lewis (2002) as ‘payments to individual and institutional 
providers in-kind or cash that are outside the official payment channels, or are purchases that are meant to 
be covered by the health care system’.   34 
Figure 13: Reasons why respondents did not seek health 
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Despite evidence of an informal system of exemptions being practiced by health 
professionals, out-of-pocket payments for health care are exacting a high toll on 
household welfare. Out of all households reporting that they needed health care in the last 
year in Kyrgyzstan, 18 percent said it had been very difficult to pay for such care and a 
further 42 percent reported it had been difficult. Over half of households reported 
reducing current consumption in order to meet the costs of health care, a third received 
help from relatives and a further 27 percent borrowed money and thus went into (or 
extended existing) debt (Figure 14).   
 
Figure 14: Strategies to raise money for health care amongst 
households needing care in last year, Kyrgyzstan 2001
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A similar picture is found elsewhere in the CIS-7. In Armenia patterns of health care 
utilisation indicate that the poor face access and/or cost constraints when seeking health 
care. Only 26 percent of those reporting that they suffered from ill health in the poorest   35 
quintile received some type of health care compared to more than 51 percent among those 
in the richest quintile (World Bank, 2002a). In Tajikistan health seeking behaviour was 
found to be inversely related to poverty, with only 4 percent of individuals in the bottom 
quintile reporting that they sought medical a ssistance in the last two weeks compared 
with 9 percent in the top (Falkingham, 2000a). A study in the Ferghana valley in 
Uzbekistan by Cashin (2001) confirmed that the burden of expenditures falls 
disproportionately on the poor; expenditures on health care comprised 22% of food 
consumption amongst the poorest quintile compared to just 15% amongst the richest 
quintile. Table 13, taken from Cashin (2001) provides quantitative evidence on the 
significance of borrowing and delayed care due to financial barriers and shows that this 
was a significant barrier not only for the poorest but also other segments of the 
population in Ferghana. 
 
Table 13:  Financial Barriers to Health Care in Ferghana 
% of Those Seeking Health Care  in the Past 30 Days (#) 
Income Quartile 
 
Indicator of 
Financial Barrier 
First 
(lowest) 
Second  Third  Fourth 
(highest) 
Total 
Sample 
Did not seek health care 
because not enough money 
 
31.5 
(63) 
26.1 
(57) 
15.6 
(34) 
13.5 
(30) 
21.2 
(184) 
Finding the money to pay 
for health care was difficult 
 
77.0 
(57) 
79.2 
(76) 
63.8 
(74) 
57.5 
(69) 
68.0 
(276) 
Needed to borrow money to 
pay for health care 
 
25.0 
(22) 
22.9 
(22) 
15.4 
( 19) 
9.8 
(12) 
17.5 
(75) 
Source: Cashin (2001). Sample sizes in parentheses. 
 
The present mixture of unregulated prescription charges and payments for consultations 
that has emerged across the CIS-7 is both inefficient and inequitable. The costs falling on 
the users of the health services vary widely and arbitrarily. Ability to pay for health care 
is now a major problem amongst the poor and there is growing evidence that, despite 
informal systems of targeting, access to health care is being affected. The challenge 
facing policy makers is how to take them into account and to ensure that equity in access 
to health care is achieved. This is important from a human development perspective and a 
human rights standpoint. The long-term development prospects of the country rest on its 
human, intellectual and social capital. What is clear is that a growing proportion of the 
poor can no longer afford ‘free’ health care. 
4.1.4 Access to safe drinking water and other services 
Good health is not only a function of material resources and access to health services, but 
is also affected by other environmental factors, particularly access to safe drinking water.  
Again it appears that those households who suffer material poverty are also likely to be 
disadvantaged with respect to access to other utilities. Figure 15, using data from the 
recent household budget survey in Uzbekistan demonstrates differences  in access to 
services by household economic status. Poorer households live in homes with less access   36 
to running water and public sewerage. Similar patterns are found elsewhere in the region 
(see Figure 16 for Kyrgyzstan). 
 
Figure 15: Access to Utilities by Poverty Status, 
Uzbekistan HBS 2000-2001
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Figure 16  Environmental/Health Conditions of Kyrgyz Housing in 2001,  
(% of houses with access to services) 
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Source: Figure 2.3 (World Bank, 2000d). 
As Figure 16 illustrates, there are significant differences in terms of environmental and 
health conditions between urban and rural areas, with the average access of the richest 
quintile in rural areas in Kyrgyzstan for each of the four health/sanitary indicators being 
worse than that of the poorest quintile in urban areas. Moreover, the poorest two quintiles 
in rural areas lives in houses without a flushing toilet or bathroom/shower. 
 
Statistics on access alone can be misleading, over-stating the proportion of the population 
enjoying safe water and utilities.  While virtually all Kyrgyz households are connected to 
the electricity grid, interruptions in the electric supply are very common.  Only four out 
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of every ten households have electric interruptions less frequently than once a week.  In 
other words, six out of every ten households report electricity interruptions once or more 
per week, on average (World Bank, 2002d).  A survey in Azerbaijan found that although 
95 percent of the households in Baku reported being connection to the water system, 
water was actually available for 22 days of each month, on average, and for only four 
hours each day.  Moreover, 87 percent of households believed that the piped water they 
received was unsafe.  The poor in Baku were even less likely to have water every day of 
the month or throughout the day , and were more likely to report illness attributable to 
water, than non-poor households (World Bank 1995).  Similarly, while most households 
in Armenia have water pipes in their homes, service is unreliable, typically available for a 
few hours each day.  About 12 percent of households report being without water for three 
months or more (World Bank 2002a).  From this it is clear that significant investments in 
infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, will be needed if the MDG on environmental 
sustainability of reducing by half the proportion of the population without access to an 
improved water source is to be achieved by 2015.  
 
Box 3: Housing quality and access to water and other utilities in Tajikistan 
 
•  7% of Tajik households reported that their home was damaged during the war, of which a quarter 
experienced significant damage and a third almost completely destroyed 
 
•  Less than half of all households have access to piped water. Nearly a quarter are reliant on water from 
river/lake /ponds and a further eighth on spring water (probably actually the best source!) 
 
•  Of those who have piped water, a quarter reported that water was only available for five hours a day or 
less; and only 36% reported 24 hour availability. 
  
•  Only a half of households reported that  their water quality was good/excellent and a half reported 
fair/poor 
 
•  75% of households reported no source of hot water 
 
•  Only 14% of households have a flush toilet. 85% rely on an outside latrine 
 
•  The most common source of fuel used by households for cooking was wood (43%), followed by 
manure (17.5%) and cotton stem (12.3%). Similarly the most common usual source of heat was wood 
stove (45%) followed by manure/peat (23.6%). Burning solid fuels indoors has important implications 
for health as indoor air pollution is associated with numerous respiratory complaints. 
 
•  A third of households had only heated their home for 3 months or less in the last year; two-thirds 
heated it for 4 months or less. 
 
•  14% of households have a phone inside the dwelling, 17% rely on neighbours. 54% stated that they 
had NO access to a phone. 
 
Source: Falkingham 2000a using 1999 TLSS. 
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4.2  EDUCATION 
Two of the Millennium Development Goals concern education.  One is to achieve 
universal primary education by 2015; the other to eliminate g ender disparities in 
education at all levels.  The countries of the CIS-7 began the transition with an enviable 
record on education, with near-universal literacy. Attendance at school was compulsory 
from ages 7 to 15, and there was also an extensive system of kindergartens for pre-school 
age children and technical and vocational schools for post-compulsory education. 
However, over the last decade there have been serious reversals in several countries and 
it is likely that the high literacy rates of the past will not be sustained in future 
generations.  
 
The impact of economic decline on education outcomes may be thought of as being 
three-fold (see Falkingham, 2000b). Firstly decreased access (and increased costs) may 
reduce enrolment. Parents who are unable to afford the cost of textbook, uniforms, or 
even shoes, may simply withdraw their children altogether. Secondly, even if enrolled, 
children may not actually attend school regularly: either for the reasons given above or 
because the children are needed as family labour (working in the home looking after 
younger children, or working on family land or in the hired labour market to supplement 
household income). Finally, children may be enrolled and be attending school, but may 
not actually be benefiting from the education. The teacher may be absent on a second job, 
or there may be no textbooks, it may be too cold to concentrate due to lack of heat, or the 
child may anaemic and/or malnourished and too lethargic to learn. There is very little 
evidence concerning learning outcomes and this section of the paper therefore focuses on 
trends in kindergarten, primary and secondary school enrolment (MDI #6) and school 
attendance. Finally, emerging gender disparities (MDI # 9) are discussed. 
4.2.1 Enrolment 
One of the most worrying trends is the decline in the proportion of children aged 3-6 
enrolled in pre-primary school education (Table 14). Prior to independence attendance at 
kindergarten was widespread. Over 60 percent children in the target age group were 
enrolled at kindergartens in Moldova, around a half in Armenia and Georgia, third in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Since independence, rates have fallen dramatically in all 
countries. %). This is in part due to the closure of enterprise based (employer-provided) 
kindergartens. However enrolments have fallen by more than the drop in capacity 
suggesting a fall in demand for kindergarten places as well as their supply (Klugman et 
al, 1997). A survey in Tajikistan indicated that mothers increasing preferred to take care 
of their children at home. Reasons for not using child-care facilities included lack of 
heating and personnel and concerns over food safety. Just over a tenth stated that children 
were not attending to rising costs (Falkingham, 2000c). Such trends are of concern given 
the role that kindergartens can play in raising household welfare, both in terms of freeing 
the parent to participate in other activities, specifically paid employment, and the 
developmental role of pre-school education and nutritional and health i nterventions 
(Klugman et al, 1997).  
 
Primary education continues to be compulsory, and enrolment rates in basic education 
have generally remained high. However, there have been worrying falls in enrolment in   39 
basic education in Armenia and Georgia; data from the UNICEF MONEE project 
indicates that only four out of five children aged 7-15 are now enrolled in school in 
Armenia. Furthermore, as is discussed in Section 4.2.2 below, enrolment rates tell only 
part of the story, and there is a growing problem of declining school attendance.  
 
Post-compulsory education enrolments have fallen dramatically. The proportion of 15-18 
year olds attending general secondary schools has declined by over 40 percent in 
Tajikistan, a third in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia.  
 
Table 14 Changes in school enrolment rates (% of the relevant age group), CIS-7, 1989-
2000 
  Pre-primary enrolment rate  Basic education 
  1989  2000  % change 
1989-2000 
1989  2000  % change 
1989-2000 
Armenia  48.5  23.9  -51%  95.5  79.5  -17% 
Azerbaijan  21.6  15.8  -27%  87.9  89.6  +2% 
Georgia  43.6  27.4  -37%  95.2  86.1  -10% 
Kyrgyzstan  31.3  8.7  -72%  92.2  95.9  +4% 
Moldova  61.2  36.8  -40%  94.1  93.5  -1% 
Tajikistan  16.0  5.5  -66%  94.1  88.4  -6% 
Uzbekistan  36.8  18.2  -51%  92.0  97.0  +5% 
 
  General secondary (15-18 yrs)  Tertiary (19-24yrs) 
  1989  2000  % change 
1989-2000 
1989  2000  % change 
1989-2000 
Armenia  35.9  32.1  -11%  19.3  15.5  -20% 
Azerbaijan  34.0  23.2  -32%  11.9  14.3  +20% 
Georgia  41.3  28.2  -32%  19.1  30.7  +61% 
Kyrgyzstan  36.7  23.5  -36%  13.2  34.6  +162% 
Moldova  27.4  22.7  +1%  16.2  21.1  +30% 
Tajikistan  40.4  22.8  -44%  11.5  11.4  -1% 
Uzbekistan  36.3  30.9 
1  -15%  15.0  6.6 
1  -56% 
Note: 
1  1989  
Source: UNICEF Transmonee database 2002.
 
 
In contrast there has been significant growth in higher education in four of the countries, 
particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Virtually all of the growth in 
tertiary education has been in the private sector with a proliferation of private colleges in 
fields that were under-represented in the past - most notably business studies, economics 
and law.  
4.2.2 School Attendance 
Given tight education budgets and capitation funding formulas, in many countries there is 
an incentive to over-register enrolments in order to maintain existing teaching posts and 
schools.  Thus enrolment rates may overestimate the actual number of children attending 
school. Furthermore, significant non-attendance by children that are enrolled means that 
data on official enrolments may be a poor indicator of the number of children actually 
receiving educational services.  Evidence from the Uzbekistan 2000/2001 Household 
Budget Survey indicates that genuine levels of school attendance were well below   40 
enrolment levels reported in registration-based data (World Bank, 2002e). The highest 
rate of current school atten dance (for the school year) reported by respondents was 82 
percent, and average attendance rates amongst boys and girls aged 7-15 (when education 
is theoretically compulsory) were 79 percent and 77 percent respectively (Figure 17). 
This is significantly lower than the 97% reported for Uzbekistan in official data in Table 
13, and indicates a serious erosion of the country’s human capital. 
 
Figure 17: School Attendance by Age & Gender, 
2000/2001
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Non-attendance at school may occur due to a variety of circumstances including both 
demand and supply side factors. Features of the system itself, particularly the availability 
and quality of education institutions and programs can play a significant role in 
determining attendance. For example, in Georgia over half of children who were absent 
from school cited the absence of a teacher, lack of heating or excessive distance as the 
primary reason (World Bank, 2002c). Other supply side factors such as lack of textbooks 
and other materials were also cited in the poverty assessments for most countries.  
 
However there is evidence that absenteeism is more prevalent among the poor and that 
economic factors are an important determinant for many families. Traditionally children, 
particularly those from rural areas have been absent at the beginning and end of the 
school year due to the need for children to help the autumn harvest and the planting in the 
spring.  However there is evidence that withdrawing children from school to supplement 
household income is now becoming more widespread. In Armenia, only 52 percent of 
poor rural households reported that their children attended school very regularly 
compared with 68 percent of non-poor households.  
 
Box 4: Falling school attendance in Tajikistan – Voices of the children 
Student attendance in Tajikistan has fallen dramatically due to the need to provide for families, the lack of 
clothing, poor health, physical insecurity and the inability to afford books and stationery, and in many areas 
due to a total lack of school facilities. 
 
 “Poverty is when I strongly desire to study but my family cannot provide me with books, notebooks or 
even clothes to go to school.”   41 
 
“ There are three children in our home. We go to school in turn because there are no clothes and shoes for 
each us.” 
 
“ My parents do not ask me about homework now, but how much money I have earned today.” 
 
In the areas of Bokhtar, Khojamaston and Qabodiyon, most girls have missed school. 
Fazolat explains “Me and my girlfriends frequently miss class. Sometimes we work in the field, sometimes 
we sell milk and vegetables, and sometimes we look after our smaller brothers sisters.”   
 
Source: De Soto, Gordon and Saidov (2001) 
 
Evidence from the Uzbekistan 2000/2001 Family Budget Survey illustrates that there is a 
consistent and direct relationship between family income and school attendance at all 
levels of education (Tables 15 and 16). Families with higher incomes tend to consume 
more education in terms of both frequency of school attendance for their children and 
their expenditures on education, than families with lower incomes. Similar findings are 
evident in all other countries of the CIS-7.  
 
Table 15 Uzbekistan: Percentage of Children 7-15 Years Currently Attending School 
By Household Consumption Quintiles 
Quintile*  Percent attending school 
  Male  Female  Total 
Poorest  68.7  68.0  68.3 
2
nd  76.6  77.8  77.2 
3
rd  79.9  78.1  79.0 
4
th  81.4  79.3  80.4 
Richest  85.5  83.3  84.4 
All  78.2  76.9  77.5 
Note: *Based on per-capita food consumption evaluated at purchase price 
Source: Family Budget Survey, April 2000 – March 2001, weighted results 
 
Table 16 Uzbekistan: Percentage of Children Currently Pursuing Post-Compulsory 
Education, by type of Program and Household Consumption Quintiles (in %) 
  General Secondary  PTU/SPTU  Technikum   University 
All  33.3  5.3  7.6  3.3 
Urban  31.9  8.5  13.0  6.1 
Rural  34.1  3.6  4.9  1.8 
Quintile         
Poorest  27.2  3.5  2.9  1.2 
2nd  34.1  5.5  6.3  2.0 
3
rd  33.1  5.7  6.8  2.2 
4th  36.4  4.9  8.5  3.6 
Richest  35.5  6.7  13.3  7.2 
Note: Age groups for the four columns are 15-17, 16-17, 16-19, and 18-23, respectively. 
Source: Uzbekistan Family Budget Survey 2001.   
 
With rising costs at both school and college it is difficult to resist the conclusion put 
forward in a recent UNDP report that the education systems in the CIS-7 are coming to 
reflect the increasing socio-economic stratification these societies. In Azerbaijan, half of 
all university students come from the richest two quintile groups (World Bank, 2002b).   42 
Evidence from qualitative social assessments highlight that students and their families are 
increasingly expected to pay bribes to ensure admission to elite school, to receive good 
marks and to secure entry into University, with the result that students from poor families 
are excluded (Dethier, 2002). In Georgia the richest 20 percent of households spent an 
average of 22 times more on educating children than the poorest 20 percent (World Bank, 
2002c). Access to quality education is now confined substantially to those who can afford 
private fees, private tuition. It is imperative that action is taken to ensure that the growing 
poverty and stratification outlined in Section 2 above does not result in the re-emergence 
of illiteracy within the region and the cycle of deprivation and social exclusion that 
accompany it. 
4.2.3 Gender and Education 
Gender equality in education was a key achievement of the Soviet era. As Table 15 
shows, there is little difference in school attendance rates between boys and girls within 
income group. This is confirmed in Figure 18, which shows the sex ratios of gross 
enrolment at different levels of education, adapted from Paci (2002). In primary school, 
the ratio of boys to girls is almost exactly one – that is, there is the same number of boys 
as girls.  In secondary school, some dispersion emerges.  In most of these countries, the 
ratio increases, indicating more girls than boys are enrolled.  Beyond compulsory 
education, a gap between boys and girls opens up. In most countries the ratio increases, 
indicating that more girls than boys are enrolled. The main exceptions to this are in 
Armenia and Tajikistan where the ratio falls
19. Girls’ advantage continues into tertiary 
education, except in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. 
 
Figure 18:   Sex composition of enrollment
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Looking at the situation in Tajikistan in a little more detail, Table 17 shows that 
enrolment in post-compulsory education has fallen for both boys and girls, from over 50 
percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 1998. There have been significantly gender disparities 
within this decline. In the past, there were almost as many girls as boys participating in 
continuing education. In 1990 there were 111 thousand boys compared with 107 
                                                  
19 Note that data from the FBS in Armenia indicates that boys are more likely than girls to drop out of post 
compulsory schooling. Thus the data point for Armenia should be treated with some caution.   43 
thousand girls. Most girls attended general secondary schools, whilst a larger minority of 
boys went on the professional and vocational institutions. However, over the period 
1990-1998, the number of boys enrolled in post-compulsory education fell by 28% from 
111 thousand to 80 thousand, whilst the number of girls fell by 53%, from 107 thousand 
to 50 thousand. Thus a significant gender gap has opened up. There are now just 63 girls 
per 100 boys in general secondary schools, whereas in 1990 there were 104 girls per 100 
boys. The gender gap in higher education has also widened, from 58 girls per 100 boys in 
1990 to just 34 in 1998. 
 
Table 17 Selected statistics for enrolment in post-compulsory education, Tajikistan 1990-
1998 
  1990  1992  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Secondary education             
Enrolment rate General secondary education (15-18)*  41.5  29.7  38.6  41.7  34.1  30.9 
Enrolment rate techn/vocational education (15-18)*  9.8  8.6  8.8  6.6  6.2  5.4 
Ratio of enrolled girls per 100 boys:             
  General Secondary  104    71  68  63  63 
  Professional technical colleges  69    89  99  95  94 
  Vocational secondary  58    37  35  35  34 
             
Tertiary education             
Enrolment rate tertiary education (18-22)*  9.4  9.3  n/a  9.4  8.9  n/a 
Ratio of enrolled girls per 100 boys:             
  Higher education  58    37  35  35  34 
Source; Falkingham (2000c) 
 
Figure 19: The Gender Gap in Education in 
Tajikistan
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It is clear that if the current trend of falling enrolments and increasing gender differentials 
remains unchecked Tajikistan is at risk of losing one of the main social achievements of 
the Soviet period. In response to this, a new country-wide Cash Compensation Program 
(CCP) or targeted social assistance to poor families designed to stimulate attendance of   44 
school children has recently been introduced (beginning of 2002). The program aims to 
reach 20 percent of school children aged 6-15 of poor families. This is a start. 
 
5. POLICY RESPONSES TO POVERTY 
The preceding sections have painted a bleak picture of falling real incomes, growing 
poverty, declining life expectancy, rising child malnutrition and deteriorating educational 
status. However it is not all bad news. Over the last three years economic growth has 
been positive in all seven countries. Significant progress has made on land reform in 
several countries, and this has been reflected in fall in poverty rates.  
5.1 PROMOTING PRO-POOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, REDUCING INCOME INEQUALITIES 
Achieving pro-poor growth must remain at the heart of effort to alleviate poverty. 
However it will be important to address the economic, institutional and political causes of 
poverty simultaneously. Economic growth alone will not be sufficient. From the 
discussion above it is clear that one of the driving factors behind the growth or poverty 
over the last decade has been falling real wages and rising income equality.  As well as 
inequality being undesirable in its own right from a point of view of social justice and 
social welfare maximisation, there is mounting evidence that inequality is bad for growth 
Aghion et al, 1999), undermines confidence in the government, fosters social exclusion 
and impairs the functioning of democracy (World Bank, 2000a).  
 
In countries where disparities in incomes are large it will be difficult to substantially 
increase the incomes of poor families in the short- to medium-term without some 
reduction in those income differences. However rather than reducing inequality, the 
actions of the administrations to date have, as discussed above, often had the reverse 
effect.  A key route to reducing income inequality is the establishment of transparent and 
efficient product markets. But progress here has been hampered both by the slow pace of 
progress in restructuring (or closing) many of the large nonviable state enterprises, and by 
the capture of these and other state institutions by vested interests, who have been able to 
obtain high economic rents in the absence of competition (Table 18).  It is notable that no 
country in the CIS-7 has achieved a score of more than 2.0 on the EBRD index of 
enterprise reform, and indeed Uzbekistan suffered a reversal between 1996 and 2000. 
 
Table 18 Progress in Enterprise restructuring and competition policy  
  Index of enterprise reform  Index of competition policy 
  1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000 
Armenia  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Azerbaijan  1.0  1.7  2.0  1.0  2.0  2.0 
Georgia  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  2.0  2.0 
Kyrgyzstan  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  2.0  2.0 
Moldova  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.7  2.0  2.0 
Tajikistan  1.0  1.0  1.7  1.0  1.7  1.7 
Uzbekistan  1.0  2.0  1.7  1.0  2.0  2.0 
Note: Classification of enterprise restructure: 1 Soft budget constraints; few other reforms to promote corporate governance; 2 
moderately tight credit and subsidy policy but weak enforcement of bankruptcy legislation and little action to strengthen competition 
and corporate governance; 3 significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and promote corporate governance   45 
effectively; 4 substantial improvement in corporate governance; 4+ standards and performance typical of advanced  industrial 
economies. Classification of competition policy: 1. No competition legislation and institutions; 2. competition policy legislation set 
up, some reduction of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms; 3 some enforcement to reduce abuse of market 
power, substantial reduction of entry restrictions; 4 significant enforcement actions; 4+ standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies, unrestricted entry to most markets. 
Source: EBRD (2001) 
 
There has also been little progress since the mid 1990s with introducing, and enforcing, 
effective competition. In general, better progress has been made in the privatisation of 
housing, small and medium enterprises and banks, but large enterprise privatisation 
remains largely unfinished, particularly in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (Table 19).  
However, poor levels of governance mean that small-scale entrepreneurs face significant 
barriers in establishing or maintaining any new business (Dethier 2002).  
 
Table 19 Progress in Privatisation  
 
  Small-scale privatisation  Large-scale privatisation 
  1992  1996  2000  1992  1996  2000 
Armenia  2.0  3.0  3.3  1.0  3.0  3.0 
Azerbaijan  1.0  2.0  3.3  1.0  1.0  1.7 
Georgia  1.0  4.0  4.0  1.0  3.0  3.3 
Kyrgyzstan  2.0  4.0  4.0  2.0  3.0  3.0 
Moldova  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.7  2.0  2.0 
Tajikistan  1.0  1.0  1.7  1.0  1.7  1.7 
Uzbekistan  1.0  3.0  3.0  1.0  2.7  2.7 
Note:  EBRD Index of privatisation based upon privatisation revenues, private sector share in GDP and private sector share in 
employment, including employment in private registered companies as well as in private entities engaged in informal activity.  
Classification of small-scale privatisation: 1 little progress; 2 substantial share privatised; 3 nearly comprehensive programme 
implemented; 4 complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights; 4+ standards and performance typical of 
advanced industrial economies, no state ownership of small enterprises, effective tradability of land. Classification of large-scale 
privatisation: 1 little private ownership; 2 comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation, some completed; 3 more than 25% 
of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands; 4 more that 50% of state-owned enterprises and farm assets in private ownership and 
significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises; 4+ standards and performance typical of advanced industrial 
economies, more than 75% enterprise assets in private ownership with effective governance. 
Source: EBRD (2001) 
 
Vandycke (2002) identifies the weak business environment as being one of key reasons 
for the absence of a more dynamic private sector in the CIS-7.  According to the results 
from the latest round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS), the most prominent type of business obstacle across the CIS-7 is taxation. 
However corruption is also seen as an important obstacle in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan.  
 
Reform in the financial markets also remains slow. Only Azerbaijan improved its EBRD 
reform index last  year. However the recent news that the HSBC banking group has 
withdrawn its operations from the country will provide a setback (EBRD, 2002). In 
general credit markets remain shallow with the outcome that small firms face difficulties 
in obtaining finance for even working capital – again hindering development. There have 
however been numerous success stories at a local level of small businesses being aided 
by micro-credit facilities, usually funded by the donor community and run by NGOs. One 
such scheme funded by UNHCR in Pankisi valley in Georgia has helped establish a small 
bakery and café providing livelihoods for several local families. In Tajikistan micro-
credit has helped rural women establish a small agro-food processing business  for   46 
preserving and  bottling fruits and vegetables that would otherwise have rotted before 
going to market. 
 
In order to promote pro-poor growth the countries of the CIS-7 need to foster a business 
environment that is conducive to private sector development by  
•  Improving governance and reducing ‘bribe tax’ 
•  Streamlining administration, reducing  ‘time tax’ 
•  Strengthening credit markets 
•  Simplifying taxation, reducing incentives to engage in tax avoidance and evasion 
•  Strengthening the legal framework 
5.2. PROTECTING AND BUILDING HUMAN CAPABILITIES 
As well as additional effort to promote economic growth and reduce inequality, public 
action is also necessary to protect and build capabilities so that the poor are able to take 
advantage of new income generating opportunities. As we have seen clear differentials in 
both health and education are emerging.   
 
There is an urgent need to invest in schools and primary health care facilities to minimise 
absenteeism and non-use due to supply side factors. However, unless governance issues 
are tackled, higher social spending in the social sectors may do little to enhance the 
human capital of the poor. Many countries need to strengthen public expenditure 
management systems to ensure that public funds are used for their intended purposes, and 
reduce the rent-seeking behaviour of health and education professionals. In particular it is 
essential to break the vicious cycle of the system of bribes and corruption within the 
social sectors. The demand for high informal payments for health care are, in part, a 
product of the informal payments demanded in universities and in particular in medical 
schools where future health professionals become indebted and are subsequently required 
to make payments to obtain jobs. This, in turn, leads to pressure to generate additional 
incomes in the form of informal payments extracted from patients. 
 
There is evidence that need to pay bribes to enter good quality post compulsory education 
institutions is undermining the future human capital of the countries. Registered 
unemployment rates are significantly higher amongst those aged 15-24 than in the rest of 
the population, reaching over 50 percent in Uzbekistan. Given that there is a mis-match 
between the skills required in a new market economy and those obtained under the old 
soviet system a priority must be to retain young people within education in order to 
provide the country with the skills required. 
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Critical in improving staying-on rates within education will be ensuring free and fair 
access. In order to do this, it is vital that the basic pay of educationalists is guaranteed at a 
level that affords a living wage. This could be achieved by reducing the number of 
teachers and increasing their pay. Attention also needs to be given to ensuring sufficient 
resources are directed towards materials as well as labour. 
 
Public expenditure within the health sector could be usefully reallocated towards basic 
primary services, away from specialised tertiary care. Governments also need to 
acknowledge that health care as it currently stands is not free. As such scarce resources 
need to be focussed on the provision of a basic health care package that is guaranteed for 
all regardless of ability to pay. 
 
For those who are unable to work, either through health, disability or old age, or because 
sufficient jobs are not available, a social safety net which provides an adequate level of 
income will be critical. It is clear that i t is not possible to maintain universal welfare 
benefits at levels that can have a significant effect on poverty alleviation. It is essential, 
therefore, to rationalise the existing system of benefits and to establish an efficient and 
administratively feasible strategy to identify and target the poor. 
 
So far much of the debate has centred around the means-testing what were formerly 
universal cash benefits although there has some interesting experiments within the region on 
other forms of targeting. In Armenia proxy means testing has been used as an alternative to 
the straight income test. In Uzbekistan an innovative approach to targeting social assistance 
has been introduced which is organised by the ‘Mahallah’ (local level committees of 
dignitaries). Another option which deserves greater attention in the Central Asian context is 
the promotion of targeting through self-targeting mechanisms such as public works, for 
the able bodied, or soup kitchens.  So far such options have not received much attention 
from Government as they are perceived as being politically unpopular. However food-
for-work programmes have been successfully implemented in many regions by the World   48 
Food Programme.  School feeding programs are also worthy of wider consideration, 
filling two objectives in one go by encouraging school attendance and improving child 
nutrition. Again  however it is important to note that without improved governance, there 
is no guarantee that such services will be delivered. 
 
The main barrier facing future poverty reduction efforts within the region is the political 
will to tackle head on the vested interests that are holding back restructuring, stifling 
small-scale private enterprise and frustrating efforts to improve public expenditure 
management. Poor governance remains an issue at all levels of society, affecting the 
small business, the farmer trying to take their goods to market, the elderly person needing 
health care, and the bright young student wanting to go to university but too poor to pay.  
It is unlikely that real improvements in material and capability poverty will be achieved 
unless and until governance is improved. This will require strengthening systems of 
public administration and financial management, increasing transparency and political 
accountability, greater community involvement in decision-making processes as well as 
the creation of a competitive and buoyant private sector. This is the challenge facing 
policy makers within the CIS-7 for the first decade of the new millennium. 
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